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ENFORCEMENT
OF DEED-RESTRICTIONS -- SETBACK REQUIREMENTS
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[1]
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IN
THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JULY
TERM 2008
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| [2] |
Case No. 5D07-3143 |
| [3] |
2008.FL.0005555 |
| [4] |
August 1, 2008 |
| [5] |
ELEANOR KIRSCHNER, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN BALDWIN AND GINA BALDWIN, APPELLEES. |
| [6] |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard
County, James Earp, Judge. |
| [7] |
Thomas C. Houck, Cocoa Beach, for Appellant. |
| [8] |
Allen P. Whitehead of Frese, Hansen,
Anderson, Anderson, Heuston & Whitehead, P.A., Melbourne, for Appellee. |
| [9] |
The opinion of the court was delivered by:
Evander, J. |
| [10] |
Eleanor Kirschner brought an action for
injunctive relief and damages against her neighbors, John Baldwin and Gina
Baldwin, alleging that the Baldwins had constructed a new garage in
violation of their subdivision's recorded restrictions. After a non-jury
trial, the trial court found that the subdivision's restrictions imposed a
35-foot rear setback requirement on the Baldwins' property and that their
garage encroached almost 15 feet into the setback. Notwithstanding these
findings, the trial court found that Kirschner was not entitled to
injunctive relief because: (1) she lacked standing to bring her action;
(2) her claim was barred by the administrative res judicata doctrine; (3)
she had waived any right to bring her claim by not objecting to the
construction of the garage at an earlier date; (4) she was estopped to
enforce her claim because of her inaction; and (5) it would be inequitable
to require the Baldwins to remove the garage. The trial court dismissed
Kirschner's claim for damages because of her failure to introduce evidence
upon which a monetary award could be based. |
| [11] |
We affirm, without discussion, the trial
court's dismissal of Kirschner's claim for damages. However, we reverse
the trial court's denial of Kirschner's claim for injunctive relief and
remand for further proceedings. |
| [12] |
Kirschner and the Baldwins reside on
adjoining lots in the Coquina Point Subdivision in Malabar, Florida. It is
undisputed that both lots are subject to the subdivision's Declaration of
Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, and Agreements
("Declaration"). The Baldwins' residence is located on the
southwest corner of Coquina Terrace and Rocky Point Road. The Indian River
flows alongside Rocky Point Road -- immediately east of the Baldwins'
property. Pursuant to the Declaration, the front of the Baldwins' property
is deemed to face Rocky Point Road. Accordingly, the Baldwins' north side
yard is adjacent to Coquina Terrace. The Kirschner property fronts Coquina
Terrace and is immediately west of the Baldwins' property. Thus, the
Baldwins' rear lot line abuts Kirschner's east side yard. |
| [13] |
The Declaration provided varying setback
requirements for each lot. As to the Baldwins' property, the Declaration
provided for 20-foot side setbacks and a 35-foot rear setback. The
Declaration also provided for a property owners' association (POA). Plans
for the construction of any structure were required to be submitted for
approval to the POA. The POA was authorized to refuse approval of plans
and specifications "upon any ground, including purely aesthetic
grounds." Importantly, the Declaration provided that although the POA
was to approve or disapprove submitted plans within thirty (30) days, its
failure to do so did not relieve a lot owner of the obligation to comply
with the Declaration's covenants and restrictions. Finally, the
Declaration clearly provided that the covenants and restrictions contained
therein run with the land and inure to the benefit of each lot owner. |
| [14] |
On October 9, 2003, the Baldwins mailed a
letter to the POA enclosing a copy of the plans and surveys for the
proposed construction of a large garage -- capable of holding eight or
more cars. The Baldwins did not receive a response from the POA within 30
days of submitting the plans. The POA's then-president, John Stillings,
testified that he was out of the state from July, 2003 until late
November, 2003, and was never made aware of the Baldwins' written request
for approval of building plans for the new garage. He described the state
of the association as "laid back." |
| [15] |
In order to obtain the necessary building
permit, the Baldwins also submitted their plans to the Town of Malabar.
Without a variance, the Town Code required that any structure built on the
Baldwins' lot would have to be a minimum of 20 feet from Coquina Terrace.
The Baldwins' plans called for the north wall of the garage to be only 15
feet from Coquina Terrace. Accordingly, the Baldwins requested a five-foot
setback variance. Notice of the requested variance was sent by Malabar to
neighboring property owners, including Kirschner. Kirschner did not file
any objections or appear at any town meeting in which the Baldwins'
variance request was considered. Importantly, however, the Baldwins'
variance did not relate to any rear setback requirement. The notice sent
by Malabar to Kirschner did not reflect or suggest that the Baldwins'
proposed garage would be less than 35 feet from Kirschner's property. |
| [16] |
Upon obtaining the building permit, the
Baldwins began construction of their garage on or about January 13, 2004.
The walls and trusses were up shortly thereafter. At some point in late
January or early February, Mr. Stillings confronted Mr. Baldwin about the
garage appearing to be in violation of the subdivision's restrictions. Mr.
Baldwin, by his own admission, told Mr. Stillings "if you have
something on your mind or something you don't like, get an injunction,
stop me . . . I'm going to proceed unless I hear otherwise." |
| [17] |
On February 25, 2004, the POA mailed a
letter to the Baldwins requesting the plans for the garage and inviting
them to attend a POA meeting scheduled for March 8th. By March 8th, the
exterior of the garage was substantially completed. The Baldwins did not
attend the March 8th Meeting. |
| [18] |
The POA consulted its attorney and held
meetings on March 8th, March 22nd, and March 29th, to discuss whether the
POA should initiate legal action against the Baldwins. Ultimately, the POA
declined to file suit against the Baldwins. The Baldwins were notified of
the POA's decision by letter dated March 30, 2004. The letter reflects
that the POA chose not to pursue litigation because a POA officer (not Mr.
Stillings) had given "verbal approval" of the plans to Mr.
Baldwin. (Interestingly, Mr. Baldwin later testified that he could not
recall receiving "verbal approval" from a POA officer, and that
even if he had, he would not have given any weight to an
"approval" that was not in writing.) |
| [19] |
After the POA declined to bring suit against
the Baldwins, Kirschner contacted an attorney. Kirschner's attorney
delivered a letter to the Baldwins on May 20, 2004, notifying them of
Kirschner's intent to enforce the Declaration's restrictions. |
| [20] |
Kirschner filed suit on August 23, 2004, and
the trial was held on August 13, 2007. In a detailed written order, the
trial court set forth five alternative reasons to deny Kirschner's request
for injunctive relief. We will address each one. |
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STANDING |
| [22] |
The trial court found that Kirschner did not
having standing to assert her claim because the Declaration did not
expressly grant lot owners the right to enforce the subdivision
restrictions. We respectfully disagree with the trial court's conclusion.
The Declaration specifically provided that the covenants and restrictions
inured to the benefit of all lot owners. As a clearly intended beneficiary
of the Declaration, Kirschner had the right to enforce the subdivision's
restrictions. Osius v. Barton, 147 So. 862, 868 (Fla. 1933) (restrictive
covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of
covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
(well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive
covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
(benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in
subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to
enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner's enforcement rights.
The Declaration's language that the restrictions and covenants contained
therein inured to the benefit of all lot owners implicitly confirmed
Kirschner's right of enforcement. |
| [23] |
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA |
| [24] |
The doctrine of administrative res judicata
is applicable to rulings or decisions of administrative bodies. Miller v.
Booth, 702 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Res judicata precludes the
litigation of the same claim between the same parties on the same cause of
action. Costello v. The Curtis Bldg. P'ship., 864 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Fla.
5th DCA 2004). The administrative res judicata doctrine is not applicable
in this case. First, the POA is not an administrative body. Second, the
POA's decision not to pursue litigation against the Baldwins did not
constitute an adjudication, nor purport to constitute an adjudication, of
the dispute between Kirschner and the Baldwins. |
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WAIVER |
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The trial court found that Kirschner waived
any right she may have had to enforce the restrictions in the Declaration
due to her failure to timely object. In reaching this conclusion, the
trial court emphasized that Kirschner had failed to notify Malabar of her
objections and had further failed to voice her objections directly to the
Baldwins prior to the delivery of her attorney's letter on May 20, 2004. |
| [27] |
We initially observe that Kirschner's
failure to notify Malabar of her objections is not supportive of the
Baldwins' waiver argument. The Baldwins' variance request related to a
side setback -- not the rear setback. The Baldwins could have constructed
a garage in compliance with the Declaration's rear setback requirements
regardless of whether the variance request was granted by the Town of
Malabar. The town's notice to Kirschner did not suggest, in any way, that
the Baldwins were intending to place the garage's west wall only 20 feet
from Kirschner's lot. Kirschner could properly assume that the Baldwins
would construct their garage in compliance with the Declaration's rear
setback requirements. |
| [28] |
The trial court found that construction of
the garage began on or about January 13, 2004. The block walls and trusses
were up by the end of January or February and the exterior of the garage
was substantially completed by March 8, 2004. It is undisputed that Mr.
Baldwin was made aware of at least one objection to the proposed garage in
late January or early February. The relatively short time periods existing
in this case simply do not support a finding of waiver. "Waiver"
is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or
conduct which infers the relinquishment of a known right. Taylor v. Kenco
Chemical & Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). When a
waiver is implied, the acts, conduct or circumstances relied upon to show
waiver must make out a clear case. Woodlands Civic Ass'n., Inc. v. David
W. Darrow, D.C., P.A., 765 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
Furthermore, in the context of restrictive covenants, this court has
stated that there must be a "long-continued waiver or acquiescence in
the violation of a restrictive covenant" for waiver to be found.
Mizell v. Deal, 654 So. 2d 659, 663 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Here, the
Baldwins received an objection to their proposed garage from the POA's
president within a few weeks of commencement of construction. |
| [29] |
ESTOPPEL |
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The evidence also does not support a finding
of estoppel. The Baldwins acknowledge that they did not rely on any
representation by Kirschner in deciding to place their garage less than 35
feet from Kirschner's lot line. Estoppel based on silence cannot exist
where the parties have equal knowledge of the facts or have the same means
of ascertaining that knowledge. See Mizell, 654 So. 2d at 663; Pelican
Island Prop. Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Murphy, 554 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989). |
| [31] |
EQUITY |
| [32] |
Lastly, the trial court found that it would
be inequitable to require the Baldwins to remove that portion of the
garage which encroached into the 35-foot setback. In reaching this
conclusion, the trial court considered the significant cost of removing
the encroachment as well as the lack of evidence that the value of
Kirschner's property was diminished by the construction of the garage.
While acknowledging that the Baldwins' garage impaired Kirschner's view of
the river, the trial court found that there was no evidence as to whether
the encroachment into the setback impaired Kirschner's view to any greater
amount than if the garage had been constructed in compliance with the
Declaration's restrictions. The trial court further concluded that the
Baldwins had not willfully and intentionally violated the Declaration's
restrictions. |
| [33] |
A trial court may properly decline to order
the removal of an encroachment when it would be inequitable to do so. See,
e.g., Brewer v. Hibbard, 424 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Pilafian v.
Cherry, 355 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). A primary factor to be
considered in determining whether a mandatory injunction should be entered
is whether the defendant's viola tion of a restrictive covenant was
intentional and willful. Daniel v. May, 143 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
In the present case, the trial court made two erroneous legal findings to
support its conclusion that the Baldwins had not willfully violated the
setback restriction. First, the trial court found that the Baldwins could
reasonably rely upon Kirschner's failure to object to their variance
request in deciding to proceed with construction of their garage. As
previously observed, the Baldwins' variance request did not relate to the
rear setback requirement. Additionally, the variance request did not give
constructive notice to Kirschner of the Baldwins' intent to construct a
garage less than 35 feet from Kirschner's lot line. Therefore, it was not
reasonable for the Baldwins to assume that Kirschner did not object to the
proposed encroachment. |
| [34] |
Second, the trial court wrongly concluded
that there was a conflict between the Declaration's provision requiring
the POA to act on a lot owner's proposed plans within 30 days and the
Declaration's provision that no structure was to be built in violation of
the Declaration's covenants or restrictions. Section 4 of the Declaration
gave the POA the authority to reject plans and specifications for the
construction of a structure "upon any ground, including purely
aesthetic grounds." The last paragraph of section 4 provided: |
| [35] |
Should [the POA] fail to approve or
disapprove the plans and specifications submitted to [it] by the owner of
a lot or lots within the subdivision within thirty (30) days after written
request therefor, then such approval shall not be required, provided,
however, that no building or other structure shall be erected or be
allowed to remain on any lot which violates any of the covenants or
restrictions herein contained. |
| [36] |
These provisions are not in conflict. We
interpret this section to mean that the POA would lose its right to reject
a proposed structure on aesthetic grounds if it did not act within 30 days
of the lot owner's submittal of plans. On the other hand, the POA's
failure to approve or disapprove submitted plans within 30 days could not
be construed to constitute approval of the construction of a building or
other structure in violation of the Declaration's covenants or
restrictions. |
| [37] |
In light of our opinion, the trial court is
directed to reconsider whether equity supports the granting of a mandatory
injunction. See Brewer; Daniel. |
| [38] |
REVERSED and REMANDED. |
| [39] |
PALMER, C.J. and LAWSON, J., concur |
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