FORECLOSURE -- REVERSAL
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Opinion filed July 21, 2004
McKenna v. Camino
Real Village Association, Inc., No. 4D03-4786
(Fla.App.
07/21/2004)
[1]
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IN
THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT JULY
TERM 2004
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[2]
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CASE
No. 4D03-4786
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[3]
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2004.FL.0002969
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[4]
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July
21, 2004
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[5]
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CHERYL
MCKENNA, APPELLANT,
v.
CAMINO REAL VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLEE.
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[6]
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Appeal
from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach
County; John D. Wessel, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502002CA013001XXRFAW.
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[7]
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Richard
W. Glenn of Law Office of Richard W. Glenn, West Palm Beach, for
appellant.
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[8]
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David
A. Core of St. John, Core & Lemme, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
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[9]
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The
opinion of the court was delivered by: Hazouri, J.
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[10]
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Camino
Real Village Association, Inc. (the Association) filed a Complaint for
Foreclosure, Damages, Pre-Judgment Interest, Costs, and Attorneys' Fees
against Cheryl McKenna. The suit is based on a Claim of Lien filed against
McKenna's condominium for unpaid assessments. McKenna denied owing the
amounts alleged and asserted several affirmative defenses including the
Association's failure to comply with its regulations regarding notice of
delinquency in payment of assessments and acceleration of future
assessments. The Association filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The
trial court granted the motion and entered a Summary Final Judgment of
Foreclosure. We reverse.
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[11]
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The
standard of review of the entry of summary judgment is de novo. See
Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130
(Fla. 2000). A party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively
the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the court must draw
every possible inference in favor of the non-moving party. See Bruckner v.
City of Dania Beach, 823 So. 2d 167, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). If the
evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is conflicting, if it
will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the
issue, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be
determined by it. Id.
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[12]
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All
owners of condominiums in Camino Real Village are necessarily members of
the Association. On August 29, 2002, the Association sent McKenna a letter
stating that she owed money for past due assessments, interest, late fees,
and attorneys' fees and costs. The letter informed McKenna that the
Association filed a Claim of Lien against her property and included a copy
of the Claim of Lien for her review. The letter also stated that if the
Association did not receive payment by October 1, 2002, the Association
would bring legal action to foreclose the Lien and for a judgment against
McKenna personally. The Claim of Lien, which was recorded on August 30,
2002, states that McKenna owes the Association the following assessments:
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[13]
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Due
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Amount
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July
1, 2002
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$.78
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August
1, 2002
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$503.82
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August
1, 2002
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$229.89
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September
1, 2002
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$229.89
(accelerated assessment)
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October
1, 2002
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$229.89
(accelerated assessment)
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November
1, 2002
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$229.89
(accelerated assessment)
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November
1, 2002
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$503.82
(accelerated assessment)
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December
1, 2002
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$229.89
(accelerated assessment)
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[14]
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The
Declaration of Condominium and Bylaws allow the Association to accelerate
assessments if a unit owner is in default in the payment of an assessment.
The relevant provisions are as follows:
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[15]
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Paragraph
19.2 of the Declaration of Condominium:
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[16]
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Interest
on Default. Assessments and installments thereon, not paid when due,
shall bear interest from the date when due until paid at the highest
rate allowed in Florida which is not then usurious. In the event any
unit owner shall be more than thirty (30) days delinquent in the payment
of any assessment, the Board of directors, at its discretion, may upon
seven (7) days written notice to the unit owner, declare due and payable
all assessments applicable to such unit for the fiscal year of the
Association in which the delinquency occurs.
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[17]
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Article
VII, Section 3 of the Bylaws:
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[18]
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Acceleration
of Assessment Installments Upon Default. If a unit owner shall be in
default in the payment of an installment upon any assessment, the Board
of Directors may accelerate the remaining monthly installments for the
fiscal year upon notice thereof to the unit owner and, thereupon, the
unpaid balance of the assessment shall become due upon the date stated
in the notice, but not less than fifteen (15) days after the delivery of
or the mailing of such notice to the unit owner.
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[19]
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Both
of these provisions require the Association to give the unit owner proper
notice prior to any acceleration of assessments.
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[20]
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McKenna
argues that she established a genuine issue of material fact when she
filed the Affirmative Defenses alleging that: 1) she did not owe the
amounts due under the Claim of Lien and 2) the Association had failed to
comply with the procedural requirements set out in the Declaration and
Bylaws, including providing prior notice of the acceleration to McKenna.
When the Association filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, it addressed
the issue of amount due by submitting an affidavit. However, the
Association failed to address McKenna's allegations that she did not
receive proper notice of the acceleration and that the Association did not
follow its outlined procedures regarding delinquency. Therefore, McKenna
contends that the trial court should not have entered final summary
judgment in favor of the Association. We agree.
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[21]
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In
Berg v. Bridle Path Homeowners Association, 809 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA
2002), this court dealt with a similar situation and reversed the entry of
final summary judgment. In Berg, the homeowners association filed suit
against Berg seeking to foreclose assessment liens recorded against the
property. Id. at 33. In her answer, Berg asserted that the liens were
improper because the association had failed to comply with certain
requirements in its own declarations and bylaws. The trial court ruled
that Berg had failed to prove her "defenses" by the greater
weight of the evidence and entered judgment in favor of the association.
Id. at 34. However, on appeal this Court reversed. This Court held that
the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof. Once a defendant
makes a specific denial of a particular element of the claim, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving its entitlement to judgment. Berg's
affirmative defenses placed the burden on the association to prove every
material allegation of its complaint which is denied by the party
defending against the claim. This Court stated:
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[22]
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We
hold that in order to prevail on a suit to foreclose an assessment lien,
a homeowners association is obligated to show that it has properly
levied the assessment in accordance with the community's declaration of
restrictive covenants and by-laws when the defendant challenges the lack
of compliance "specifically and with particularity."
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[23]
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Id.
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[24]
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In
the instant case, the Association argues that McKenna failed to create
issues of fact because she did not file any memoranda or affidavits in
opposition to its Motion for Summary Judgment. However, applying the
reasoning in Berg, once McKenna filed the Affirmative Defenses asserting
the Association's failure to comply with the requirements in the
Declaration and Bylaws, the Association had the burden to prove that it
complied with the requirements in its Declaration and Bylaws.
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[25]
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When
the Association issued the Claim of Lien on August 29, 2002, the
Association listed both the July 1, 2002 assessment and the August 1, 2002
assessments as being delinquent. The Association used those delinquent
payments as the basis for the acceleration of future assessments. However,
when the Claim of Lien was filed, the only assessment that was more than
thirty days delinquent was the $.78 that was due on July 1, 2002. The
August assessments were not yet more than thirty days delinquent.
Therefore, the only delinquent assessment that could form the basis for
the acceleration of future payments was the $.78. In addition, the
Association has not provided any evidence to establish that it gave
McKenna the written notice required in the provisions prior to filing the
Claim of Lien which accelerated the future payments.
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[26]
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McKenna
concedes that she did not make the payments required in August; however,
the Association's Complaint sought damages not only for the August
payment, but also based on accelerated future assessments through the end
of the year. It appears from the record that there is at least a question
of fact whether the Association complied with its provisions regarding
acceleration of future assessments. We, therefore, reverse the entry of
Final Summary Judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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[27]
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REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
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[28]
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GUNTHER
and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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